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HomeMy WebLinkAbout06-004 deYoungOPINION OF THE COMMISSION Before: Louis W. Fryman, Chair John J. Bolger, Vice Chair Donald M. McCurdy Paul M. Henry Raquel K. Bergen Nicholas A. Colafella Reverend Scott Pilarz DATE DECIDED: March 29, 2006 DATE MAILED: March 30, 2006 Re: Challenge to Nomination Petition of Marie deYoung To The Honorable Mary Hannah Leavitt, Judge of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania: This Opinion is issued in response to an Order of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania dated March 23, 2006, at docket number 140 M.D. 2006, directing this Commission to issue and file a disposition with the Court's Prothonotary on or before March 30, 2006, at 4:00 p.m., as to the following issues. ISSUES: (1) Whether, pursuant to the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act ( "Ethics Act "), 65 Pa. C.S. §1101, et seq., a candidate who has filed a Statement of Financial Interests identifying her "direct or indirect source of income" as "Self- employed: Marie deYoung community minister, writer, consultant" has complied with the financial disclosure requirements of Section 1105(b)(5) of the Ethics Act or must also identify each customer, client or parishioner as a source of income; Whether the aforesaid disclosure, if insufficient to comply with Section 1105(b)(5) of the Ethics Act, constitutes an amendable or fatal defect; and Whether a more stringent standard should be applied to Statements of Financial Interests filed in conjunction with nomination petitions as opposed to those filed for other purposes when determining whether a Statement of Financial Interests complies with the Ethics Act and (2) (3) 06 -004 deYoung, 06 -004 March 30, 2006 Page 2 whether a defect is amendable. II. FACTUAL BASIS FOR DETERMINATION: This matter arises from a lawsuit filed in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania challenging the nomination petition of Marie deYoung (deYoung) as a Democratic Candidate for State Representative for the 163 Legislative District, which lawsuit was file by Harry M. Riley, IV (Riley), a registered Democrat and qualified elector of the 163 District. The procedural history of this case is as follows. On March 3, 2006, deYoung filed her nomination petition with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of State together with a copy of her Statement of Financial Interests for the 2005 calendar year. We take administrative notice of the fact that deYoung's original Statement of Financial Interests was filed with this Commission on March 3, 2006. On March 14, 2006, Riley filed a Petition to Set Aside Nomination Petition of deYoung in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. On March 17, 2006, the Court scheduled a hearing on the Petition for March 23, 2006, and ordered both parties to file a memorandum of law addressing the issue of whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires that the State Ethics Commission determine whether Respondent has filed a deficient Statement of Financial Interests. On March 23, 2006, Bruce H. Bikin, Esquire, Counsel for deYoung, and Michael L. Maddren, Esquire, Counsel for Riley, appeared before the Honorable Mary Hannah Leavitt, Judge, at which time Counsels each submitted a Memorandum of Law and jointly submitted a Stipulation of Facts. It is noted that the Stipulation of Facts included, inter alia, the following: 4. Respondent deYoung inadvertently omitted a source of income, earned during calendar year 2005, in excess of $1300.00 from her Statement of Financial Interests. 5. The source of income Ms. deYoung omitted from her Statement of Financial Interests was of the type required to be disclosed thereupon under the rules for completing the statement and the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act. Stipulation of Facts, paragraphs 4 -5. Following the hearing, Judge Leavitt entered an order dated March 23, 2006, setting forth the following facts and issues. DeYoung is seeking to have her name placed on the ballot for the 2006 primary election as a Democratic candidate for State Representative for the 163 Legislative District. As required by law, deYoung attached a Statement of Financial Interests to her nomination petition. In Block 6 of the Statement of Financial Interests, deYoung indicated that her occupation or profession was that of a "community minister, writer, consultant." In Block 10, requiring disclosure of direct or indirect sources of income, deYoung wrote, "Self- employed: Marie deYoung /community minister, writer, consultant." Riley filed a lawsuit challenging deYoung's nomination petition. Riley asserts that deYoung's response in Block 10 of her Statement of Financial Interests is insufficient. In particular, Riley contends that deYoung's entry in Block 10 does not disclose the persons who made a payment to deYoung for her community ministering, writing or consulting. DeYoung concedes that in the course of her self - employment in 2005, she did receive 1 deYoung, 06 -004 March 30, 2006 Page 3 (one) payment in the amount of $2,000, which exceeds the $1,300 reporting threshold. Riley argues that deYoung was required to disclose but did not disclose this single payment, and therefore, her candidacy must be stricken. DeYoung argues that she is the "source" of her income, which she disclosed on her Statement of Financial Interests, and therefore, she correctly completed the form. DeYoung further argues that it is clear from the face of her Statement of Financial Interests that her income was derived from the activities that she listed as part of her self - employment. DeYoung contends that even if she were required to identify all those who engaged her services, her failure to disclose those individuals is an amendable defect. Riley asserts that the defect is not amendable, and that because the Election Code requires strict enforcement, a Statement of Financial Interests filed in conjunction with a nomination petition is subject to a narrow and strict enforcement standard. Because of this, Riley argues that deYoung is precluded from amending her Statement of Financial Interests. Finally, Riley contends that a Statement of Financial Interests filed by a candidate is subject to a higher or stricter standard of compliance than one filed in any other context in which it is required by the Ethics Act. While retaining jurisdiction, Commonwealth Court transferred the matter to this Commission directing that we issue and file a disposition with the Court's Prothonotary on or before 4:00 p.m., March 30, 2006, responding to the aforesaid three questions. The Commonwealth Court record was forwarded to this Commission. The transcript of the March 23, 2006, proceedings establishes that the particular payment in question is a consulting fee paid by a check in the amount of $2,000 from Dr. Paul Scoles payable to deYoung. (3/23/06 Tr. at 10 -12). At the March 23, 2006, hearing in Commonwealth Court, Counsel for deYoung acknowledged that disclosure of the source of this particular payment was not subject to confidentiality /privilege. (3/23/06 Tr. at 30). On March 27, 2006, Counsels for deYoung and Riley each filed with this Commission a Memorandum of Law. Candidate deYoung first argues that a self - employed individual who acts as a sole proprietor and adequately describes the nature and character of her activities as such should not be required to reveal more than an individual who operates his own business as a corporation or partnership. DeYoung contends that to hold a sole proprietor to a different standard is unfairly discriminatory, arbitrary and a denial of equal protection. DeYoung further argues that by fully identifying her self - employment activities as encompassing "community minister, writer, consultant," she provided as much information as any sole corporate proprietor would have been required to offer and satisfied the Ethics Act's purpose, which she maintains is to give the general voting public a fair summary of her sources of income. DeYoung next argues that if her response in Block 10 of her Statement of Financial Interests is indeed insufficient, she should be permitted to amend. DeYoung asserts that the purpose of the Statement of Financial Interests is to publicly disclose any financial activities or transactions that might give a voter "pause" before casting a ballot for that candidate. DeYoung asserts that in order for the purpose of the Ethics Act to "best be effectuated," such disclosure need only be accomplished prior to the actual voting by the electorate. DeYoung contends that there is no substantive difference between providing the required financial information in an original filing versus an amended filing, as long as the disclosure is accomplished well before the actual vote occurs. DeYoung further argues that it is improper to analogize the reasoning for the applicability of a Fatality Rule to Nominating Petitions to alleged defects in Statements of Financial Interests. DeYoung maintains that strict compliance with the signature deYoung, 06 -004 March 30, 2006 Page 4 requirements under the Election Code is necessary to assure that the signor is indeed the person so registered to vote with the County Board of Election and aids in review and examination of the signatures on a challenged petition, but strict compliance with the Ethics Act filing requirements is not necessary to accomplish the Ethics Act's purpose in requiring full public disclosure prior to the vote of the electorate. DeYoung contends that "otherwise qualified candidates" should be provided "every opportunity" to comply with the requirements of the Ethics Act, and that an objector suffers no detriment by permitting an amendment to the challenged candidate's Statement of Financial Interests. In addition, deYoung argues that the error on her Statement of Financial Interests, if it indeed exists, is "de minimis" as that term is defined in the Ethics Act at 65 Pa.C.S. § 1102. While deYoung acknowledges that the cited definition might not have been intended to be applied as to a candidate's defective Statement of Financial Interests, she contends that the recognition by the General Assembly of such a concept indicates that there is less than "Bright Line" clarity in identifying and classifying certain financial transactions. She contends that the potential sanction of the fatality of her nomination petitions would be a greater penalty than should be provided for her failure to disclose the source of one $2,000 payment. Finally, deYoung argues that permitting a candidate to amend an erroneous or incomplete Statement of Financial Interests furthers the objective of the Ethics Act without unfairly punishing potential candidates for clerical errors or what deYoung describes as "de minimis" errors in their Statements of Financial Interests. Challenger Riley argues that entering "self- employed" on a Statement of Financial Interests is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Ethics Act and the Regulations of this Commission. Riley points out that the Statement of Financial Interests form's instructions for Block 10 require filers to "include the source name and address, not the dollar amount, of any payment, fee, salary, expense, allowance, forbearance, forgiveness, interest income, dividend, royalty, rental income, capital gain, reward, severance payment, prize winning, and tax exempt income." Statement of Financial Interests form Instructions, at 2 (Emphasis added). Riley contends that listing "self- employed" in Block 10 of the form does not satisfy the requirements of the Ethics Act because it fails to disclose to the reader the source from which the payment originated. Riley contends that such a listing therefore constitutes a facial defect. Riley further asserts that the defect to deYoung's Statement of Financial Interests is fatal to her nomination petition. Citing Section 1104(b)(3) of the Ethics Act, Riley argues that the Ethics Act prohibits a candidate from appearing on the primary election ballot if the candidate fails to file the Statement of Financial Interests form in accordance with all of the requirements of the Ethics Act. Thus, Riley contends that if the candidate's Statement of Financial Interests, when filed, does not comply with the provisions of the Ethics Act, it constitutes a fatal defect to the candidate's nomination petition. In the instant case, Riley contends that deYoung failed to disclose a $2,000 payment from Dr. Paul Scoles for consulting services despite the fact that there was no statute, professional code or common law privilege preventing her from disclosing Dr. Scoles as a source of income. Therefore, Riley contends that based upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decisions in In re Nomination Petition of Benninghoff, 578 Pa. 402, 852 A.2d 1182 (2004) and In re: Nominating Petitions of Braxton, 583 Pa. 35, 874 A.2d 1143 (2005), this Commission must find that deYoung's omission of Dr. Scoles as a source of income constitutes a fatal defect to deYoung's nomination petition. Finally, Riley contends that the standard for Statements of Financial Interests filed in conjunction with a candidate's nomination for office does not differ from the standard for Statements of Financial Interests filed for other purposes, but the penalties for non- compliance do differ. Citing Benninghoff, Riley asserts that the Supreme Court did not rule that Benninghoff's Statement of Financial Interests was properly submitted; it found deYoung, 06 -004 March 30, 2006 Page 5 that the Statement of Financial Interests was defective, but amendable because it substantially complied with the requirements of the Ethics Act. Thus, Riley argues that the standard for whether there is a defect in a Statement of Financial Interests is the same regardless of the purpose for which it is filed. Despite the uniform standard, Riley argues that candidates, unlike public officials and public employees, are not permitted to amend defective Statements of Financial Interests and may not appear on the ballot if they do not file a Statement of Financial Interests in accordance with the provisions of the Ethics Act. By letters dated March 24, 2006, Bruce H. Bikin, Esquire, Counsel for deYoung, and Michael L. Maddren, Esquire, Counsel for Riley, were notified of the date, time and location of the public meeting at which this matter would be considered. At the public meeting on March 29, 2006, Attorney Bikin, deYoung, and Attorney Maddren appeared and offered to answer any questions from this Commission. III. DISCUSSION Before we begin our analysis of the three questions posed by Commonwealth Court, we initially note that the Court has not directed us to consider as part of our analysis any impact of the parties' factual stipulations whereby deYoung has admitted that she inadvertently omitted from her Statement of Financial Interests a source of income in excess of $1,300 that was earned during calendar year 2005, which source was of the type required to be disclosed on the Statement of Financial Interests form. Stipulation of Facts, paragraphs 4 -5. The impact of such admissions is properly for the Commonwealth Court to determine, and we only note the admissions in order to provide a complete recitation of the facts. We begin our analysis of the three questions posed by Commonwealth Court by reviewing the relevant provisions of the Ethics Act. Sections 1104 and 1105 of the Ethics Act provide, in pertinent part, as follows: § 1104. Statement of financial interests required to be filed (b) Candidate.- - (1) Any candidate for a State -level public office shall file a statement of financial interests for the preceding calendar year with the commission on or before the last day for filing a petition to appear on the ballot for election. A copy of the statement of financial interests shall also be appended to such petition. (3) No petition to appear on the ballot for election shall be accepted by the respective State or local election officials unless the petition has appended thereto a statement of financial interests as set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2). Failure to file the statement in accordance with the provisions of this chapter shall, in addition to any other penalties provided, be a fatal defect to a petition to appear on the ballot. § 1105. Statement of financial interests (a) Form. —The statement of financial interests filed deYounq, 06 -004 March 30, 2006 Page 6 pursuant to this chapter shall be on a form prescribed by the commission. All information requested on the statement shall be provided to the best of the knowledge, information and belief of the person required to file and shall be signed under oath or equivalent affirmation. (b) Required information. —The statement shall include the following information for the prior calendar year with regard to the person required to file the statement: (5) The name and address of any direct or indirect source of income totaling in the aggregate $1,300 or more. However, this provision shall not be construed to require the divulgence of confidential information protected by statute or existing professional codes of ethics or common law privileges. 65 Pa.C.S. §§ 1104(b)(1), (3); 1105(a), (b)(5). Section 1105(b)(5) of the Ethics Act requires the filer to disclose the name and address of any direct or indirect source of reportable income. The following key terms pertaining to disclosure under Section 1105(b)(5) of the Ethics Act are defined in the Ethics Act as follows: § 1102. Definitions "Income." Any money or thing of value received or to be received as a claim on future services or in recognition of services rendered in the past, whether in the form of a payment, fee, salary, expense, allowance, forbearance, forgiveness, interest, dividend, royalty, rent, capital gain, reward, severance payment, proceeds from the sale of a financial interest in a corporation, professional corporation, partnership or other entity resulting from termination or withdrawal therefrom upon assumption of public office or employment or any other form of recompense or any combination thereof. The term refers to gross income and includes prize winnings and tax - exempt income. The term does not include gifts, governmentally mandated payments or benefits, retirement, pension or annuity payments funded totally by contributions of the public official or employee, or miscellaneous, incidental income of minor dependent children. "Source." Any person who is a provider of an item reportable under section 1105 (relating to statement of financial interests). "Person." A business, governmental body, individual, corporation, union, association, firm, partnership, committee, club or other organization or group of persons. "Business." Any corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, firm, enterprise, franchise, association, organization, self - employed individual, holding company, joint deYoung, 06 -004 March 30, 2006 Page 7 stock company, receivership, trust or any legal entity organized for profit. 65 Pa.C.S. § 1102. We initially note that the Ethics Act is remedial legislation. Phillips v. State Ethics Commission, 470 A.2d 659 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984). The Ethics Act is specifically designed to restore public confidence in government, and to that end, the Preamble of the Ethics Act directs: In order to strengthen the faith and confidence of the people of this Commonwealth in their government, the Legislature further declares that the people have a right to be assured that the financial interests of holders of or nominees or candidates for public office do not conflict with the public trust. Because public confidence in government can best be sustained by assuring the people of the impartiality and honesty of public officials, this chapter shall be liberally construed to promote complete financial disclosure as specified in this chapter. 65 Pa.C.S. § 1101(a) (Emphasis added). The first question posed by the Commonwealth Court is whether, pursuant to the Ethics Act, a candidate who has filed a Statement of Financial Interests identifying her "direct or indirect source of income" as "Self- employed: Marie deYoung community minister, writer, consultant" has complied with the financial disclosure requirements of Section 1105(b)(5) of the Ethics Act or must identify each customer, client or parishioner as a source of income. Through a straightforward application of Section 1105(b)(5) and the related definitions set forth above, we determine that the candidate's aforesaid disclosure would be insufficient to comply with Section 1105(b)(5) of the Ethics Act as to reportable income, for the following reasons. First, although a self - employed individual is one of the forms of businesses included within the Ethics Act's broad definition of the term "business," the self - employed individual as a form of business has no legal identity separate from that of the individual himself or herself. In this regard, the self - employed individual is significantly different from a corporation, the latter of which generally is an entity separate and distinct from its shareholders. See, e.g., In re Erie Drug Company, 416 Pa. 41, 204 A.2d 256 (1964). For purposes of reporting direct or indirect sources of income under the Ethics Act, the self - employed individual and his business are indistinguishable as recipients of business income. Therefore, a payment to a self - employed individual constitutes direct or indirect income to the individual from the payor. The foregoing result stands in sharp contrast to that of the example of a shareholder of a corporation. Because a corporation has a legal identity that is separate and distinct from the shareholders, for purposes of reporting sources of income under the Ethics Act, corporate shareholders generally need not disclose on their Statements of Financial Interests customers, clients, or other sources that have issued payments to the corporation. In the instant matter, Dr. Scoles issued a check in the amount of $2,000 payable to deYoung. The payment was a consulting fee, and it constituted income to deYoung. Dr. Scoles, as the payor, was a direct or indirect source of that income to deYoung. Based upon the above analysis, we determine that pursuant to Section 1105(b)(5) of the Ethics Act, it was insufficient for deYoung as a self - employed individual to merely disclose her self - employment as a source of income. Rather, a self - employed individual who has disclosed his or her self - employment as a source of income must disclose on the deYoung, 06 -004 March 30, 2006 Page 8 Statement of Financial Interests form each customer, client, or other non - confidential source from which reportable income in the aggregate of $1,300 or more has been received. This conclusion is consistent with the legislative intent and directive that the Ethics Act be liberally construed to promote complete financial disclosure as specified in Sections 1104 and 1105 of the Ethics Act. 65 Pa.C.S. § 1101(a). The above conclusion is also consistent with case law. See, In re: Nominating Petitions of Braxton, 583 Pa. 35, 874 A.2d 1143 (2005). In Braxton, supra, the candidate's nomination petition was challenged on the basis that the candidate failed to properly complete blocks 9, 10, 13 and 14 of his Statement of Financial Interests. One deficiency related to rental income, for which the candidate's disclosure consisted merely of the statement "Rental property in my name," without disclosure of the names of tenants or addresses of the rental properties. The lower court (Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas) opined that the candidate himself was the source of such income. (In re: Nominating Petitions of Braxton, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, No. 1407 (April 11, 2005)). On appeal, Commonwealth Court issued an Order affirming the decision of the lower court. (In re: Nominating Petitions of Braxton, 660 C.D. 2005 (April 19, 2005)). On further appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the decision of Commonwealth Court was reversed. (In re: Nominating Petitions of Braxton, 583 Pa. 35, 874 A.2d 1143 (2005)). In a per curiam Order, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded, inter alia, that the candidate had not disclosed on his Statement of Financial Interests the sources of his rental income. While the Court cited In re Nomination Petition of Benninghoff, 578 Pa. 402, 852 A.2d 1182 (2004) for the principle that a Statement of Financial Interests form is not fatally defective and can be amended if there has been substantial compliance such that the required disclosures can be facially determined from the provided information, Candidate Braxton was not permitted to amend his form. Rather, his form was fatally defective, and his failure to disclose the sources of his rental income was one of the omissions that resulted in his removal from the ballot. Cf., Heck, Order 1251, affirmed by Order of Commonwealth Court at docket 38 C.D. 2003 on October 16, 2003 (Holding that Heck, a Public Utilities Commission analyst who obtained income from real estate that he owned and rented, violated Section 1105(b) of the Ethics Act when he failed to list each tenant and address as a source of income on his Statements of Financial Interests). Similarly, in the instant matter, deYoung failed to disclose Dr. Scoles on her Statement of Financial Interests as a direct or indirect source of the aforesaid $2,000 consulting fee. This leads us to the second question posed by the Commonwealth Court: Whether the aforesaid insufficient disclosure by deYoung constitutes an amendable or fatal defect. We would initially clarify that no one is ever prohibited from amending his or her Statement of Financial Interests. However, such an amendment occurring after the applicable filing deadline has passed will not cure a fatal defect to a candidate's petition to appear on the ballot. In the instant matter, the applicable filing deadline for deYoung's petition to appear on the ballot and her related Statement of Financial Interests form has passed. Therefore, an amendment to her Statement of Financial Interests at this point in time, though permissible, will not cure a fatal defect to her petition to appear on the ballot. In applying the "four corners of the document" approach adopted by the Supreme Court in In re Nomination Petition of Benninghoff, supra, the necessary conclusion is that the aforesaid insufficient disclosure by deYoung as to a reportable direct or indirect source of income does indeed constitute a fatal defect to deYoung's petition to appear on the ballot. None of the information contained within deYoung's Statement of Financial Interests form would reveal that Dr. Scoles was a direct or indirect source of reportable income to deYoung. Turning to the third question posed by Commonwealth Court, specifically, whether a more stringent standard should be applied to Statements of Financial Interests filed in conjunction with nomination petitions as opposed to those filed for other purposes when determining whether a Statement of Financial Interests complies with the Ethics Act and deYoung, 06 -004 March 30, 2006 Page 9 whether a defect is fatal, we are constrained to conclude that there is no basis in the Ethics Act for applying any different standard to a candidate than to any other filer. A form is either in compliance with the Ethics Act or it is not. The Ethics Act does not provide for different standards, and this Commission as an administrative agency lacks the power to legislate them. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that "administrative agencies may exercise only the powers and authority conferred on them either expressly, or by necessary implication, by the Legislature." Rivera v. Philadelphia Theological Seminary of St. Charles Borromeo, 510 Pa. 1, 18, 507 A.2d 1, 10 (1986). Consistent with this principle, this Commission has been mindful to administer the Ethics Act within the statutory limitations established by the General Assembly and to avoid drawing a distinction or creating an exception that does not exist by statute. See, e.g., Richardson, Opinion 93 -006. In that the Legislature has not granted us the power to apply a more stringent standard to Statements of Financial Interests filed in conjunction with nomination petitions as opposed to Statements of Financial Interests filed for other purposes, there is only one uniform standard as to such reporting, and we apply that same standard to all filers in determining whether a given Statement of Financial Interests has been filed in accordance with the provisions of the Ethics Act. However, as noted above, a candidate is uniquely impacted by the consequence that failure to file the Statement of Financial Interests in accordance with the provisions of the Ethics Act "shall, in addition to any other penalties provided, be a fatal defect to a petition to appear on the ballot." 65 Pa.C.S. § 1104(b)(3). We reject the arguments advanced by deYoung in her Memorandum of Law filed with this Commission. First, we reject deYoung's contention that to hold a sole proprietor to a different standard than may be applicable to a filer with an ownership interest in some other form of business is unfairly discriminatory, arbitrary and a denial of equal protection. As a matter of law, there are significant differences between various forms of businesses and the resulting application of various laws to individuals who own or hold stock in such businesses. It was deYoung's decision to be a self - employed individual, and therefore deYoung cannot now be heard to complain that she is not being afforded the advantages flowing to stockholders of corporations. DeYoung's characterization of the purpose of the Ethics Act — specifically, to give the general voting public a "fair summary" of her sources of income —is an attempt to re- write the statute and is a completely unfounded assertion that flies in the face of the stated purpose of the Ethics Act and the case law favoring full financial disclosure in furtherance of the public's interests. DeYoung's various assertions that candidate statutory filing deadlines may essentially be ignored and that full disclosure on the candidate's Statement of Financial Interests form need only be accomplished prior to the actual voting by the electorate are complete misstatements of the law. They are directly contradicted by the clear statutory mandates that a candidate's Statement of Financial Interests must be filed on or before the deadline for filing his or her petition to appear on the ballot and that the candidate's failure to properly file the Statement of Financial Interests is a fatal defect to such petition. 65 Pa.C.S. § 1104(b). DeYoung's argument that the error on her Statement of Financial Interests, if it exists, is "de minimis," seeks to interject a completely inapplicable definition pertaining to conflicts of interest under Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act into Sections 1104 and 1105 of the Ethics Act pertaining to Statements of Financial Interests, the latter being an area where such definition or concept has no applicability whatsoever. The General Assembly has legislated the threshold for disclosure under Section 1105(b)(5) of the Ethics Act. As for deYoung's perceptions that the sanction she faces, specifically the fatality of deYounq, 06 -004 March 30, 2006 Page 10 her nomination petition, is too severe, we would note that the public's interest in enforcement of the Ethics Act as remedial legislation designed to restore public confidence in government and to protect the public trust is of far greater importance than deYoung's interest in avoiding the consequences of her failure to comply with the requirements for filing Statements of Financial Interests pursuant to the Ethics Act. Given our above disposition, we need not further address the arguments that have been raised by Riley. The questions posed by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania have only been addressed under the Ethics Act. IV. CONCLUSION: Pursuant to Section 1105(b)(5) of the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act ("Ethics Act "), 65 Pa. C.S. §1105(b)(5), a self - employed individual must disclose on the Statement of Financial Interests form any direct or indirect source of reportable income, including each customer, client, or other non - confidential source from which reportable income in the aggregate of $1,300 or more has been received. A candidate who indicates on her Statement of Financial Interests that she is "self- employed" as a community minister, writer, and consultant, but who fails to disclose anywhere on her Statement of Financial Interests the name and address of any customer, client, or other non - confidential source from which she received reportable income totaling in the aggregate of $1,300 or more, has failed to file her Statement of Financial Interests in accordance with the requirements of Section 1105(b)(5) of the Ethics Act. Such failure constitutes a fatal defect to a petition to appear on the ballot. When determining whether a Statement of Financial Interests complies with the Ethics Act and whether a defect is fatal, there is only one uniform standard as to such reporting, and there is no basis in the Ethics Act for applying any different standard to a candidate than to any other filer. The questions posed by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania have only been addressed under the Ethics Act. This letter is a public record and will be made available as such. By the Commission, Louis W. Fryman Chair Commissioner Nicholas A. Colafella dissents.