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HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-003 ShaulisDear Ms. Shaulis: 1999. STATE ETHICS COMMISSION _ 308 FINANCE BUILDING HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA 17120 OPINION OF THE COMMISSION Kathleen Krise Shaulis 1633 Walnut Bottom Road Carlisle, PA 17013 Before: Austin M. Le , Vice Chair Julius Uehlei Louis W. Fryman, John J. Bolger Frank M. Brown Susan Mosites Bicket DATE DECIDED: 3/18/991 DATE MAILED: 3/24/99 99 -003 Re: Former Public Official /Public Employee; Section 1103(g); Senior Assistant Counsel, Attorney 111; Attorney; Department of Revenue; Legal Representation. This Opinion is issued in response to yotir letters dated March 1 and March 5, t. ISSUE,: Whether Section 1103(g) of the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act ( "Ethics Act "), 65 Pa.C.S. §1103(g) would restrict a former Senior Assistant Counsel, classified as an Attorney III, following retirement from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Revenue, part cularly with regard to conduct which constitutes the practice of law. II. FACTUAL BASIS FOR DETERMINATION: We shall initially set forth the procedural history of this matter. By letter dated January 11, 1999, you initially contacted the State Ethics Commission for an advisory. In that letter ypu indicated that you were a Senior Assistant Counsel, Attorney III, with the Of ice of Chief Counsel, Pennsylvania Department of Revenue ( "Department "). You st ted that you had been with that Office for over 16 years, but that you would be retiri g as of Friday, January 22, 1999 to pursue other career opportunities. You noted th t for 10 of the last 12 years, you had been the Supervisor for the Pennsylvania realty ransfer tax and the public utility realty tax. You also advised the Department with resp ct to miscellaneous corporate taxes, including the title insurance company shares tax applicable to domestic companies, the gross premiums tax applicable to all other ins rance companies, and the retaliatory charge on insurance companies. You further no d that you had been the legal advisor to the Department's Voluntary Disclosure Committee. Earlier in your career, you Shaulis, 99 -003 March 24, 1999 Page 2 received training in sales and use tax, inheritance tax, and all of the motor fuel taxes. You stated that, because of your diverse background, you had been assigned to interpret and draft regulations for the implementation of the Commonwealth's first ever amnesty program. Based upon the above facts, you framed your inquiry as follows: This letter is written to request advice from the State Ethics Commission as to what extent the Ethics Law imposes restrictions upon an attorney following retirement from the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue in publishing articles and /or books on the subject of Pennsylvania states [sic] taxes. I understand that the Ethics Law may not be applied :to restrict an attorney's conduct insofar as it constitutes the practice of law. 1 also am familiar with the confidentiality provision of the Fiscal Code, 72 P.S. section 731, that restricts disclosure of confidential taxpayer information. (Shaulis letter of January 11, 1999). it is administratively noted that the aforesaid inquiry was submitted to the Commission approximately two weeks prior to the ruling of the Supreme. Court of Pennsylvania in P.J.S. v. State Ethics Commission, No. 91 M.D. Appeal Docket 1997 (Pa. January 25, 1999). Your inquiry was initially docketed for the issuance of an Advice of Counsel. By letter dated January 12, 1999 you were so advised. Approximately two weeks later, on January 25, 1999, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued its ruling in P.J.S., supra. By letter dated January 28, 1999 you were informed that upon further review, it had been determined that an Opinion of the Commission would be issued to you instead of an Advice of Counsel. The January 28, 1999 letter stated, "This change is due to the potential impact of a ruling issued by the Supreme Court a few days ago." (Hittie.letter of January 28, 1999). By letter dated January 30, 1999, you wrote again, noting that following your initial letter of January 11, 1999, you had in fact retired. You stated that you no longer have any connection with State government. You further stated that during your tenure at the Department, you never represented other persons as had been the case in P.J.S. You stated that you did not believe that the P.J.S. opinion would have any impact upon your requested ruling. You further stated: My sole inquiry was directed toward obtaining an Advice of Counsel opinion similar to No. 97 -599 dated July 24, 1997 issued to former Chief Counsel of the Department of Revenue Michael J. Semes. I specifically wanted an opinion from the Commission whether, following my retirement /departure from the Department, the writing and publication of articles and /or books on the subject of Pennsylvania state taxes would come within the preview [sic] of the practice of law or whether the one year prohibition found in section 3(g) of the Ethics Law would prohibit me from such writing... . (Shaulis letter of January 30, 1999). By letter dated February 4, 1999, you were informed that your matter had Shaulis, 99 -003 March 24, 1999 Page 3 been scheduled for consideration by the Comrnission at a public meeting to be held on Friday, February 26, 1999. During preparations for the public meeting, it was determined that you had posed a very narrow inquiry as to the writing and publication of articles and /or books on the subject of Pennsylvania state taxes, rich inquiry, as you had framed it, did not afford a proper basis for review of P.J.. and its possible impact upon former public officials /public employees engaged in the practice of law. Accordingly, on or about February 17, 1999, your advisory request was re- docketed for the issuance of an Advice of Counsel. On February 17, 1999, staff contacted you by telephone to inform you of the change. Two days later, on February 19, 1999, Shaulis, Advice of Counsel, No. 99 -511 was issued. The Advice of Counsel addressed your nquiry as follows: in applying Section 1103() to the narrow question which you have posed, specifically whether Section 1 103(g) would prohibit you . froM writing and publishing articles/books on the subject of ennsylvania State taxes, you are advised that since factu Ily, such activities would not involve representation before your former governmental body, the Department of Revenue, they would not be prohibited by Section 1103(g) of the Ethics Act. Shaulis, Advice of Counsel, No. 99 -511 at 3. The Advice further stated: In tight of your comment egarding the practice of law, it is noted that the Penns , Ivania Supreme Court's decision in P. S. v. Sta - Et i •mmi ion, No. 91 M.D. Appeal Docket 1997 (Pa. Janua 25, 1999) may have a broadening effect insofar as the application of the Ethics Act to attorneys is concerned. While not material in this particular advisory, the P.J.S. decision may be a factor in considering other activities. Shaulis, Advice of Counsel, No. 99 -511 at 3. By letter dated March 1, 1999, you h ve requested clarification of Shaulis, Advice of Counsel No. 99 -511. The focus of your request for clarification is the extent to which Section 1103(g) of the Ethics Act imp ses restrictions upon an attorney who is entering private practice following retirement from the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue. You state that based upon a review of the relevant case law and Semes, Advice of Counsel No. 97 -599, when you first requited an opinion concerning the writing and publication of articles and books concernin state taxes, you felt secure that there would be no question that as an attorney, y u could represent a client before the Department of Revenue within one year of you retirement. However, because of the above quoted paragraph from Shaulis, Advice o Counsel No. 99 -511 which references P.J.S, you now seek answers to the following uestions: 1) Whether, as an attorney, you may represent a client before the Board of Finance and Revenue; 2) Whether, as an attorney, you may represent a client before t e Board of Appeals of the Department of Revenue; 3) Whether, as an attorney, you m y participate in negotiations on behalf Shaulis, 99 -003 March 24, 1999 Page 4 of a client with respect to a case that is docketed at the Commonwealth Court where the Department of Revenue is represented by the Office of Attorney General; 4) Whether you may participate in a task force which includes representatives from the tax bar and others, where the purpose of the . task force is to assist the General Assembly in drafting proposed tax legislation; and 5) Whether you may ask Chief Counsel or a representative of the Department of Revenue for the Department's interpretation of a tax matter, either in your capacity as an attorney representing a client or as a private citizen on your own behalf. You acknowledge that the answers to these questions hinge upon the effect, of P.J.S. upon long - standing precedent. You contend that the rulings in P,J.S., supra; Maunus v. State Ethics Commission, 518 Pa. 592, 544 A.2d 1324 (1988); Wajert v. State. Ethics Commission, 491 Pa. 255, 420 A.2d 439 (1980); Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Bar Association v. Thornburgh, 434 A.2d 1327 (Pa. Cm.wlth. 1981), aff'd. aer curiam, 498 Pa. 589,. 450 A.2d 613 (1982); Kury v. State Ethics Commission, 435 A.2d 940 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981); and Commonwealth v. Stern, 701 A.2d 568 (Pa. 1997) can all be reconciled by reference to the "timing" of the conduct sought to be regulated. You opine that P.J.S. and Maunus recognize the broad authority of the Commission over an attorney's conduct .while employed by the Commonwealth. You acknowledge that even after an attorney would leave government service, activities in which he engaged during such service could be investigated by this Commission. However, you contend that an attorney's activities occurring after such employment has concluded are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. You note that Article V, section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania State Constitution vests exclusive power to govern the conduct of attorneys with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. You conclude your letter by stating, "When the attorney - client privilege ends, there is no compelling public policy reason that would justify the Commission's continued jurisdiction over the attorney's post - employment activities." (Shaulis letter. of. March 1, 1999 at 6.) You have submitted various attachments to your March 1, 1999 letter, including a copy of this Commission's agenda for the February 26, 1999 public meeting, as the agenda appeared on the Commission's website on February 16, 1999; Semes, Advice of Counsel No. 97 -599; a copy of your resume; and various materials pertaining to your rating with Martindale - Hubbell. By letter dated March 2, 1999, you were advised that your letter of March 1, 1999 was docketed for the issuance of an Opinion of the Commission. By letter dated March 5, 1999, you protest that your request for a clarification of Shaulis, Advice of Counsel No. 99 -511 has been "converted" to a request for an Opinion. You contend that there is no basis for the Commission to issue an Opinion. You cite the Commission's Regulations at 51 Pa. Code § 13.2 as having "very specific rules for requests for clarifications." (Shaulis letter of March 5, 1999 at 1). You argue that because the timely filing of a request for clarification toils the applicable period for appealing an Advice to the Commission, the Commission may not proceed unless you receive clarification. Id. at 2. Citing information set forth at the Commission's website, you instruct as to how advices are to be issued in contrast to opinions. You further argue that Chief Counsel is required to issue an Advice of Counsel based upon precedent fitting the facts submitted and not, as you contend, a theory based upon "a favorable court decision that is totally irrelevant to the facts and issues presented." (Shaulis letter. of March 5, 1999 at 2.) You state that your request is not a case of first impression; that the questions posed in your March 1, 1999 letter have been answered repeatedly by Chief Counsel for other attorneys; and that the Shaulis, 99 -003 March 24, 1999 Page 5 Commission precedent as to the questions p • We administratively note that when meeting of February 26, 1999, the issue of th 1103(g) of the Ethics Act was not properly • presented, another public meeting was sche could rule upon the matter as expeditiously a By letter dated March 15, 1999, you location of the said public meeting at which y• to be considered. On March 16, .1999, the Commissi+ confirming your receipt of the notice of the I that you would not be attending that meeting to the issuance of an opinion in response incorporating by reference all of the legal argi that you had raised in your prior communicati� III, DISCUSSION: We initially dispose Commission may not issue an Opinion in respc Shaulis, Advice of Counsel No. 99 -511. The ai reasons. First, as to advices and opinions gen provide: "The Commission will decide, within should be issued and will so advise the reques added)). A requestor does not dictate to the Co take (See, 51 Pa. Code §13.1(e)). Furthermore, as to requests for clarificat require that an advice rather than an opinion b Finally, given that there are no prior Co of P.J.S. upon Section 1' 103(g), an Opinion of response. We shall now consider the substantive P.J.S. upon Section 1103(g) insofar as it a employees who are attorneys engaged in the In the landmark case of Penns Ivani - P v. Thornburgh, 434 A.2d 1327 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1 450 A.2d 613 (1982), supra, the Commonwea of the predecessors to Section 1103(g), former an impermissible intrusion by the Legislature in concerned. The Court cited Wajert, supra, as h the Supreme Court's exclusive power to gove judges. The Court noted that any activity in professional services to a client could only be Penns Ivania Public Utilit Com ission Bar A 1331 -1332 (Note 7). Accordingly, from that consistently held that the predecessors of Secti of Act 170 of 1978 and Section 3(g) of Act restrict a former public official's /public employ sed is well - settled. Id. at 2 -3. is Commission held its recent public possible impact of P.J.S. upon Section efore us. Once the issue was squarely uled for March 18, 1999, so that we possible. were notified of the date, time, and . ur request for an advisory Opinion was n received your faxed transmission larch 18, 1999 public meeting; noting reiterating your procedural objections t o your request for clarification; and ments concerning the substantive law ns to the Commission. of your procedural argument that the nse to your request for clarification of gument has no merit for the following rally, the Commission's Regulations 4 days, whether an opinion or advice or." (51 Pa. Code §13.1(d) (Emphasis mission the form that a response shall on specifically, the Regulations do not e issued (See, 51 Pa. Code §13.2). mission precedents as to the impact the Commission is the only appropriate issues, beginning with the impact of plies to former public officials /public ractice of law.. is U ili Co mission Bar As ociation 981), aff'd. per curiam, 498 Pa. 589, th Court of Pennsylvania held that one Section 3(e) of Act 170 of 1978, was ofar as the conduct of attorneys was (ding that Section 3(e) infringed upon n the conduct of attorneys, including hich the attorney purported to render egulated by the Supreme Court. See, soci -tion v. Thorn • ur • h, 434 A.2d at oint until now, this Commission has n 1 103(g) — specifically, Section 3(e) 9 of 1989 — could not be applied to ee's conduct insofar as it constituted Shaulis, 99 -003 March 24, 1999 Page 6 the practice of law, because the Supreme Court had the exclusive authority to regulate an attorney's conduct in that regard. The "revolving door" provisions of the various Ethics Acts were limited insofar as their applicability to attorneys was concerned, because only non -legal representation before the former governmental body, such as, for example, lobbying, was restricted. See, e.g., Andrews, Opinion No. 90 -018. The Semes Advice which you have cited is just one example of the application of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Bar Association precedent. The recent decision in P.J.S. v. State Ethics Commission, supra, issued January 25, 1999, is a newer ruling by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and it is one which we are now bound to follow. This newer ruling causes us to revisit the question of whether Section 1103(g) of the Ethics Act operates to preclude even legal representation by a former public official /public employee before his former governmental body. We recognize that the appellant in P.J.S. was not a "former" public official /public employee. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court set forth in clear and certain terms the parameters of permissible regulation of persons who happen to include attorneys. The following language in the Court's Opinion as to Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act appears equally applicable to Section 1103(g): Contrary to appellant's assertion, the fact that the conduct proscribed by the conflict of interest provisions of the Ethics Act is similar to that proscribed by the Rules of Professional Conduct, does not mean that the Commission's investigation is barred. Appellant is not exempt from the jurisdiction of the Commission by virtue of his status as an attorney. Rather, appellant is subject to the jurisdiction of this court because of his status as an attorney. The jurisdiction of this court . is exclusive in the sense that it applies equally to all members of the Bar of Pennsylvania. The exclusive jurisdiction of this court is infringed when another branch of government attempts to regulate the conduct of attorneys merely because of their status as attorneys. However, the jurisdiction of this court is not infringed when a regulation aimed at conduct is applied to all persons, and some of those persons happen to be attorneys. The flaw in appellant's separation of powers argument is illustrated by this court's recent decision in Commonwealth v. Stern, 70t A.2d 568 (Pa. 1997). In Stern, this court struck a penal statute that criminalized the conduct of attorneys. 18 Pa.C.S. §4117(b)(1). In finding that the penal statute infringed on this court's exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the professional and ethical conduct of attorneys, it was the fact that the statute made the conduct at issue criminal if performed by an attorney which was significant. Where a regulation deals with attorneys as a class then it infringes upon the jurisdiction of this court. To hold, as appellant suggests, that the mere status of "attorney" exempts one from meeting the necessary professional regulations which flow from whatever position one holds in addition to that of "attorney" is absurd. Clearly appellant's status as an attorney does not bar the Commission from investigating allegations that appellant Shaulis, 99 -003 March 24, 1999 Page 7 engaged in conduct proscribed by the Ethics Act. The investigation of appellant byte Commission does not infringe upon this court's excius ve jurisdiction to regulate the ethical and professional con uct of attorneys admitted to the practice of law in this Commonwealth. P.J.S. v. State Ethics Commission, No. 91 .D. Appeal Docket 1997, Slip Op. at 9 -10 (Pa. January 25, 1999) (Emphasis add d). In light of the above ruling by the Su reme Court, we must now determine whether Section 1103(g) of the Ethics Act is o be applied to prohibit representation by a former public official /public employee bef re the former governmental' body, even if that former public official /public employee h ppens to be an attorney engaged in the practice of law. It is with the utmost deferenc and respect for the Supreme Court's exclusive, constitutional authority to regulate he ethical and professional conduct of attorneys in Pennsylvania that we consider this important issue now before us. 65 Pa.C.S. §1102. Section 1102. Definitions. Thus, Section 1103(g) meets the P.J. attorneys who happen to be within regulated g The above quoted language from P.J.S. whic regulation of persons that happen to include, b and certain and has set a new precedent fo 1103(g) of the Ethics Act fits precisely within Your argument that regulation is only per in government service necessarily fails under "meeting the necessary professional regulatio P.J.S., supra, Slip Op. at 9 -10. For a// former pu and non - lawyers alike, the Section 1103(g) res position previously held. The Court in P.J.S. drew a very clear, lo ical, and sensible distinction between the regulation of attorneys specifically, which intrudes upon the Court's jurisdiction, as opposed to the regulation of groups that ha pen to include attorneys, which does not intrude upon the Court's jurisdiction. In considering Section 1103(g) of the Et ics Act, we note that Section 1103(g) is not targeted at attorneys specifically, nor dos it regulate them exclusively. To the contrary, Section 1103(g) of the Ethics Act im oses restrictions upon a/l former public officials /public employees, some of whom are attorneys but many of whom are not. Moreover, the prohibition against representatio before the former governmental body during the first year is not targeted exclusively at legal representation. To the contrary, the key term "represent" is defined to include any form of representation: "Represent." To act on beh if of any other person in any activity which includes, b t is not limited to, the following: personal appearances, egotiations, lobbying and submitting bid or contract propos Is which are signed by or contain the name of a former public official or public employee. . criteria for permissible regulation of oups that are not limited to attorneys. sets the parameters for permissible t are not limited to, attorneys, is clear this. Commission to follow. Section those parameters. issible while the attorney is employed the P.J.S. analysis, which speaks to s which flow" from the position held. iic officials /public employees, lawyers rictions "flow" from the governmental Shaulis, 99 -003 March 24, 1999 Page 8 Therefore, based upon the new precedent set by P.J.S., we hold that during its one -year period of applicability, Section 1103(g) of the Ethics Act applies to restrict a former public official /public employee who is an attorney, even as to legal representation before the former governmental body. Our ruling in this regard shall be applied prospectively only, that is, from the date of issuance of this Opinion. Having so held, the restrictions of Section 1103(g) shall be more thoroughly reviewed, and your specific inquiries shall be addressed. As a Senior Assistant Counsel, Attorney III for the Office of Chief Counsel in the Department of Revenue ( "Department "), you would be considered a public official /public employee subject to the Ethics Act and the Regulations of the State Ethics Commission. See, 65 Pa.C.S. §1102; 51 Pa. Code §11.1. Consequently, upon your retirement from the Commonwealth, you became a "former" public official /public employee subject to Section 1103(g) of the Ethics Act. That Section provides as follows: Section 1`103. Restricted activities. (g) Former official or employee. --No former public_ official or public employee shall represent a person, with promised or actual . compensation, on any matter before the governmental body with which he has been associated for one year after he leaves that body. 6.5 Pa.C.S. §1103(g). Section 1103(g) restricts the former public official /public employee with regard to "representing" a "person" before "the governmental body with which he has been associated." Id. The definition of the term "represent" has been set forth above. The terms "person" and "governmental body with which a public official or public employee is or has been associated" are defined in the Ethics Act as follows: "Person. A business.,, governmental body, individual, corporation, union, association, firm, partnership, committee, dub or other organization or group of persons. "Governmental body with which a public official or public employee is or has been associated." The governmental body within State government or a political subdivision by which the public official or employee is or has been employed or to which the public official or employee is or has been appointed or elected and subdivisions and offices within that governmental body. 65 Pa.C.S. §1102. The term "Person" is very broadly defined. It includes, inter alia, corporations and other businesses. It also includes the former public employee himself, Confidential Opinion 93 -005, as well as a new governmental employer. Ledebur. Opinion 95 -007. Shaufis, 99 -003 March 24, 1999 Page 9 As noted above, the term "represent" i on behalf of any person in any. activity. Som include: (1) personal appearances before the f attempts to influence; (3) submission of bid or or contain the name of the former public o matters before the former governmental body (5) lobbying. Popovich, Opinion 89 -005. A former public official /public employe documents presented to his former gover official /public employee may not be identified governmental body. The public official /public regarding that person's appearance before his f however, the activity in this respect should not body: The Ethics Act would not prohibit or inquiries to the former governmental body to s Section 1 103(g) only restricts the form regard to representation before his former g official/public employee is not restricted as to r entities. However, the "governmental body with is or has been associated" is not limited to the other governmental body where the public offi but extends to the entire body. See, Le 15 at 290, 291; Sirolli, Opinion No. 90 -006; The governmental body with which you from public service is the Department of Rev limited to the Board of Appeals. Therefore, f service with the Department of Revenue, Sec apply and restrict your "representation" of Revenue, even if such representation would co Having set forth the restrictions of Sectio specific inquiries. Your first specific inquiry is whether, as a before the Board of Finance and Revenue. Revenue is within the Treasury Department, former governmental body), Section 1103(g) also broadly defined to prohibit acting examples of prohibited representation rmer governmental body or bodies; (2) contract proposals which are signed by icial /employee; (4) participating in any s to acting on behalf of a person; and Listing one's name as the person who will provide technical assistance on a proposal, document, or bid, if submitted to o reviewed by the former governmental body, constitutes an attempt to influence t e former governmental body. Section 1103(g) also generally prohibits the incius on of the name of a former public official /public employee on invoices submitte • by his new employer to the former governmental body, even though the invoices pertain to 'a contract that existed prior to termination of public service, Shay, Opinion 1 -012. However, if such a pre - existing contract does not involve the unit where the former public employee worked, the name of the former public employee may appear n routine invoices if required by the regulations of the agency to which the billing is being submitted. Abrams/Webster, Opinion 95 -011. may assist in the preparation of any mental body. However, the public n documents submitted to the former mployee may also counsel any person rmer governmental body. Once again, e revealed to the former governmental reclude making general informational cure information which is available to the general public, but this must not be done in an effort to indirectly influence the former governmental body or to otherwis make known to that body the representation of, or work for the new employ r. r public official /public employee with vernmental body. The former public presentation before other agencies or which a public official /public employee articular subdivision of the agency or ial /employee had influence or control of Hou 1989 Session, No. Opinion 90- 009 -R. ave been associated upon retirement nue in its entirety, including but not r the first year after termination of ion 1 103(g) of the Ethics Act would persons" before the Department of stitute the practice of law. 1103(g), we shall now address your attorney, you may represent a client iven that the Board of Finance and of the Department of Revenue (your would not operate to prohibit such Shaulis, 99 -003 March 24, 1999 Page 10 representation. However, with regard to your second specific inquiry, it is clear that the Board of Appeals is part of the Department of Revenue (See, 61 Pa. Code §7.1). Accordingly, pursuant to Section 1103(g), . you could not represent a client, even in your capacity as an attorney, before the Board of Appeals of the Department of Revenue during the one -year period of applicability of Section 1103(g). Your third specific inquiry is whether, as an attorney, you may participate in negotiations on behalf of a client with respect to a case that is docketed at the Commonwealth Court where the Department of Revenue is represented by the Office of Attorney General. We hold that you may not participate in such negotiations where the Department of Revenue would be participating. We are cognizant of the fact that a goodly portion of tax appeals are settled and that the Department of Revenue, your former governmental body, has significant input as to whether particular cases shall be settled or litigated. In response to your fourth specific inquiry, as to your involvement with a task force that would assist the General Assembly in drafting proposed tax legislation, you are advised that since factually, such would not constitute representation before your former governmental body, the Department of Revenue, Section 1103(g) would not be implicated, and that particular proposed conduct would not be prohibited. Finally, in response to your fifth specific inquiry, you are advised as follows. In your capacity as a tax attorney representing a client, you would be prohibited by Section 1103(g) from requesting an interpretation of a tax matter from a representative or the Chief Counsel of the Department of Revenue. In light of P.J.S., such would clearly constitute prohibited representation before your former govemmental body. However, in your capacity as a private citizen, you could request interpretations of tax matters on your own behalf since you would not be engaging in representation for compensation. Accordingly, Section 1103(g) would not apply to restrict you from seeking tax interpretations for yourself as a private citizen. The propriety of the proposed conduct has only been addressed under the Ethics Act; the applicability of any other statute, code, ordinance, regulation or other code of conduct other than the Ethics Act has not been considered in that they do not involve an interpretation of the Ethics Act. Specifically not addressed herein is the applicability of the Rules of Professional Conduct. IV. CONCLUSION: A former Senior Assistant Counsel, Attorney III, for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Revenue is a former public official /public employee subject to the restrictions of Section 1103(g) of the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act ("Ethics Act "). The former governmental body is the Department of Revenue in its entirety, including but not limited to the Board of Appeals. Section 1 103(g) of the Ethics Act prohibits the former public official /public employee from representing a person, with promised or actual compensation, on any matter before the former governmental body for one year after leaving the public position. The restrictions of Section 1103(g) as outlined above must be observed. Based upon this Commission's review of P.J.S. v. State Ethics Commission, No. 91 M.D. Appeal Docket 1997 (Pa. January 25, 1999), the restrictions of Section 1103(g) apply to restrict the former public official /public employee even as to the practice of law before the former governmental body. Our ruling in this regard is to be applied prospectively only, from the date of issuance of this Opinion. Shaulis, 99 -003 March 24, 1999 Page 11 1 Pursuant to Section 1107(10), the pers n who acts in good faith on an opinion issued to him shall not be subject to criminal f or civil penalties for so acting provided the material facts are as stated in the reques This letter is a public record and will b Finally, a party may request the Com reconsideration request must be received at th mailing date of this Opinion. The party regt detailed explanation of the reasons as to wh conformity with 51 Pa. Code §21.29(b). By the Co Austi9"i'M. Le Vice Chair made available as such. ission to reconsider its Opinion. The s Commission within thirty days of the esting reconsideration must include a reconsideration should be granted in ission,