HomeMy WebLinkAbout81-001 KuryFranklin L. Kury, Esquire
800 N. Fourth Street
Sunbury, PA 17801
I. Issue:
STATE ETHICS COMMISSION
308 FINANCE BUILDING
HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA 17120
January 27, 1981
OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
RE: Section 3(e) - Restrictions, Representation
II. Factual Basis for Determination:
81 -001
Dear Mr. Kury:
This responds to your request that the full Commission
review the Advice of Counsel previously issued to you (80 -741).
This Advice is incorporated into this proceeding.
As we perceive your questions, you seek review of the
Advice of Counsel only as to two areas:
A. Can the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) be consi-
dered within the definition of the "governmental
body" with which you were associated?
B. If so, may you appear and represent a client before
the PUC in your capacity as a lawyer before the PUC
and may the Ethics Act regulate your conduct as a
lawyer, before the PUC?
You are a former member of the Senate of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania whose term of office expired November 30, 1980.
As a member of the Senate you served as Chairman of the standing
Committee on Consumer Affairs. This Committee's main area of
concern is the PUC.
You are a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania and you intend to resume the practice of law on a
full -time basis. This practice may or may not include contact
with state agencies.
III. Applicable Law:
Section 3(e) of the Ethics Act must be reviewed. This
provides that:
Franklin L. Kury, Esquire
January 27, 1981 .
Page 2
The term "governmental body" is defined in the Act as
follows:
IV. Discussion:
"No former official or public
employee shall represent a
person, with or without
compensation, on any matter
before the governmental body
with which he has been
associated for one year after
he leaves that body." 65 P.S. 403(e).
"Any department, authority,
commission, committee, council
board, bureau, division, service,
office, officer, administration,
legislative body, or other
establishment in the Executive,
Legislative, or Judicial Branch
of the State or a political
subdivision thereof. 65 P.S. 401.
Initially, we note that you do not dispute that portion of
Advice 80 -741 which found that your "governmental body" included
the Senate and applied various restrictions to you as a "former
public official" vis -a -vis the Senate in accordance with Section
3(e) of the Ethics Act. The issue you raise initially, is
whether the PUC falls within the scope and definition of the
phrase "governmental body with which you were associated."
As we ruled in Seltzer, 80 -044 a public official may be
deemed to be "associated with" more than one "governmental
body." Essentially, the reasoning in Seltzer was that the
Legislature in Section 3(e) must be deemed to have intended to
eliminate circumstances in which a former public official could
re -exert influence over any governmental body with which he was
" associated." The term "governmental body" could, therefore,
be logically found to include any department, authority, commis-
sion, etc. with which the former employee was "associated."
Further, the term "associated" need not and should not be
strictly limited to the body where the public official might be
technically "employed."
This reasoning leads to the conclusion that a, former
public official who had served in the Legislature could be
deemed to be "associated with" the Senate or the House, as
appropriate; the non - legislative board, commission, authority,
etc. on which he may have served as ex officio or appointed
member (see additional Opinion, 80 -047); and the department,
authority, Commission, etc. which was directly related to the
standing Committee of the Legislature which the particular
Representative or Senator chaired. See Geese , particular
and
compare Goebel, 80 -045. We are not persua e to depart from
this reasoning in general or in your case.
Franklin L. Kury, Esquire
January 27, 1981
Page 3
Consequently, in your case we expressly conclude that the
"governmental body" with which you were "associated" includes
the PUC by virtue of the fact that you chaired the Senate
Consumer Affairs Committee. Your authority as Chairman of this
Committee is easily identifiable. You are undoubtedly perceived
to have had significant contact and influence with the PUC. As
Chairman you were responsible for assigning bills vital to the
PUC to sub - committees, ad -hoc committees, etc. You set the
agenda for the Committee, including calling and conducting full
public hearings on legislation. You would chair any investiga-
tive hearings relating to the PUC and legislation affecting the
PUC. This association with the PUC is sufficient to us, under
the law, to warrant application of the prohibition against
representation to you vis -a -vis the PUC.
Next, you ask whether the term "represent" if applied to
the PUC, as determined above, includes appearing before the PUC
as an attorney for a particular client and whether the Ethics
Act can constitutionally be applied to you as a lawyer. We are
fully aware of the cases decided most recently in regard to the
application of Sections 4 and 5 of the Ethics Act to solicitors
and judges. See Kremer v. State Ethics Commission, Pa.
Cmwlth. , A.2d (No. 271 C.D. 1980, issued
January 20, 1981) and Ballou v. State Ethics Commission,
Pa. Cmwlth. A.2d (No. 1013 C.D. 1980, issued
January 22, 1981). — We also recognize the ruling of the Pa.
Supreme Court in Wajert v. State Ethics Commission, Pa.
, 420 A.2d 439 (1980) which dealt with the application of
Section 3(e) of the Ethics Act to a former judge appearing in a
Court of law and found that application unconstitutional.
We recognize that we are bound to follow the holdings of
these decisions. The holdings of these decisions, however, are
narrow and clear. These holdings may be summarized as follows:
(1) Wajert held that Section 3(e) of the Ethics Act may
not applied to a former judge to preclude him from
appearing as a lawyer before the Court of Common
Pleas. Footnote 5 in Wajert specifically reserved
for future ruling of the application of Section 3(e)
to all attorneys;
(2) Kremer held that Section 4(d) and 5 of the Ethics Act
may not constitutionally be applied to judges. Thus,
the financial disclosure provisions of the Ethics Act
may not be applied to judges;
(3) Ballou held that solicitors, as attorneys, would
likewise be exempt from the financial disclosure
requirements.
None of these cases expressly addresses the question
raised here, i.e. whether the provisions of Section 3(e) of the
Ethics Act may be applied to prohibit an attorney from practi-
Franklin L. Kury, Esquire
January 27, 1981 .
Page 4
cing law before an administrative agency such as the PUC. We
realize that the direction and dictum of these decisions
arguably makes the answer to this question apparent. Neverthe-
less, we believe that to extend these rulings to answer this
question in the negative would amount to the Commission
declaring the provisions of Section 3(e) of the Ethics Act
unconstitutional as applied to a situation which was not
addressed in any of these Court rulings. We decline to do so.
Therefore, we conclude that the case of an attorney practi-
cing law before the PUC is not identical to that of the attorney,
former judge - Wajert practicing before the Court of Common
Pleas. We find no other specific precedent that compels us to
find these situations identical and since the courts have only
spoken to financial disclosure provisions of the Ethics Act
otherwise. We only find that precise precedent does not compel
us to conclude that appearing and representing another before
the PUC is, as to all matters and forums, an activity regulated
solely and exclusively by the Supreme Court.
The conclusion remains: Representing any person before
the PUC is prohibited for the one -year period after you leave
public service. Accordingly, the Advice previously issued is
clarified and affirmed as discussed herein.
V. Conclusion:
As a former State Senator you are a "former public official"
and you must comply with Section 3(e) of the Ethics Act.
Section 3(e) prohibits you from representing any person, with
or without compensation, on any matter before the governmental
body with which you were associated for a period of one year
following the termination of your service with the Senate.
The "governmental body " with which you were associated
includes the Senate where you served as Chairman of the Consumer
Affairs Committee and the PUC as discussed above, by virtue of
your role as Chairman.
For the one -year period after your term expired you may
not represent any person before the Senate or the PUC. For
this period, you may not:
1. personally appear before these bodies on specific
cases, matters, or proceedings. We reiterate our
prior rulings that members of your firm are not
subject to prohibitions applicable to you.
2. lobby before the Senate or the PUC or otherwise
attempt to influence these bodies;
3. negotiate with the Senate or PUC on contracts, for
example, except that you may administer such a contract
if awarded.
Franklin L. Kury, Esquire
January 27, 1981
Page 5
Of course, as a former public official you must, as previ-
ously advised, comply with Section 4(a) of the Act which
requires that you file a Financial Interest Statement no later
than May 1, 1981.
Pursuant to Section 7(9)(i), this opinion is a complete
defense in any enforcement proceeding initiated by the Commis-
sion, and evidence of good faith conduct in any civil or
criminal proceeding, providing the requestor has disclosed
truthfully all the material facts and committed the acts
complained of in reliance on the advice given.
This letter is a public record and will be made available
as such.
PJS /rdp
PAUL J. SMITH
Chairman
UPDATE: The Commonwealth Court (435 A.2d 940) ruled that the former Senator was not to be considered "associated
with" the Public Utility Commission by virtue of his chairmanship of the Senate Consumer Affairs Committee.
But see Update 79 -025 as to his ability to practice law within the first year after leaving the Senate.
UPDATE: A Commonwealth Court ruling (434 A.2d 1327) on similiar factual circumstances should be reviewed. Former
Commonwealth employees or officials who are attorneys may practice law before the governmental body with
which he /she has been associated regardless of the Section 3(e) (one year) prohibition. The court ruling did not
specificially address this particular opinion, but the factual circumstances may be applied to it. This Common-
wealth Court opinion was affirmed, without further opinion by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.