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HomeMy WebLinkAbout94-632 StewartDear Mr. Stewart: STATE ETHICS COMMISSION 309 FINANCE BUILDING P.O. BOX 11470 HARRISBURG, PA 17108 -1470 TELEPHONE (717) 783 -1610 ADVICE OF COUNSEL December 2, 1994 Arthur J. Stewart, Esquire Swanson, Bevevino and Millin, P.C. P.O. Box 97 311 Market Street Warren, PA 16365 94 -632 Re: Conflict, Public Official /Employee, Township Supervisor, Use of Authority of Office, SEC Investigation, Township Paid Legal Representation. This responds to your letter of October 26, 1994 in which you requested advice from the State Ethics Commission. Issue: Whether the Public Official and Employee Ethics Law presents any prohibition or restrictions upon a township supervisor with regard to using the township solicitor at township expense for his legal representation as to an investigation by the State Ethics Commission. Facts: As a Solicitor for townships of the second class, you seek an advisory opinion on behalf of a Township Supervisor who you indicate is the subject of an investigation by the State Ethics Commission. You state that the Supervisor is alleged to have improperly accepted money or other items from contractors, thereby violating the provisions against conflict of interest. The Supervisor has asked you, as Township Solicitor, to provide him with advice and legal representation should the investigation continue. The Supervisor is seeking your services not as an individual attorney, but rather as Township Solicitor. The Supervisor has specifically requested that you bill your services to the Township. You feel that the request raises several concerns. You do not wish to see this Supervisor worsen his position via the improper expenditure of Township funds — i.e., his instruction to you, as Township Solicitor, to undertake work on this particular project. Also, you are concerned about the practical difficulty of Stewart, Arthur J., Esquire, 94 -632 December 2, 1994 Page 2 potentially being called as a witness in this matter. You state that it would clearly be difficult to serve in the dual roles of advocate and witness. Based upon all of the above, you request an advisory from the State Ethics Commission. Discussion: Before addressing your inquiry, two points must initially be noted. It is initially noted that pursuant to Sections 7(10) and 7(11) of the Ethics Law, 65 P.S. § §407(10), (11), advisories are issued to the requestor based upon the facts which the requestor has submitted. In issuing the advisory based upon the facts which the requestor has submitted, the Commission does not engage in an independent investigation of the facts, nor does it speculate as to facts which have not been submitted. It is the burden of the requestor to truthfully disclose all of the material facts relevant to the inquiry. 65 P.S. § §407(10), (11). An advisory only affords a defense to the extent the requestor has truthfully disclosed all of the material facts. Secondly, it is initially noted that to the extent you have raised a concern about the difficulty of your serving as legal counsel to the Township Supervisor when you may be called as a witness to testify, such a dilemma would be governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct (which are enforced by the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court), rather than by the Ethics Law. Having set forth the above, your request shall now be addressed. A township supervisor is a public official as that, term is defined under the Ethics Law, and hence a township supervisor is subject to the provisions of that law. Section 3(a) of the Ethics Law provides: Section 3. Restricted Activities. (a) No public official or public employee shall engage in conduct that constitutes a conflict of interest. The following terms are defined in the Ethics Law as follows: Section 2. Definitions. "Conflict or conflict of interest." Use by a public official or public employee of the Stewart, Arthur J., Esquire, 94 -632 December 2, 1994 Page 3 authority of his office or employment or any confidential information received through his holding public office or employment for the private pecuniary benefit of himself, a member of his immediate family or a business with which he or a member of his immediate family is associated. "Conflict" or "conflict of interest" does not include an action having a de minimis economic impact or which affects to the same degree a class consisting of the general public or a subclass consisting of an industry, occupation or other group which includes the public official or public employee, a member of his immediate family or a business with which he or a member of his immediate family is associated. "Authority of office or employment." The actual power provided by law, the exercise of which is necessary to the performance of duties and responsibilities unique to a particular public office or position of public employment. In addition, Sections 3(b) and 3(c) of the Ethics Law provide in part that no person shall offer to a public official /employee anything of monetary value and no public official /employee shall solicit or accept anything of monetary value based upon the understanding that the vote, official action, or judgement of the public official /employee would be influenced thereby. Reference is made to these provisions of the law not to imply that there has been or will be any transgression thereof but merely to provide a complete response to the question presented. Section 3(j) of the Ethics Law provides as follows: Section 3. Restricted activities (j) Where voting conflicts are not otherwise addressed by the Constitution of Pennsylvania or by any law, rule, regulation, order or ordinance, the following procedure shall be employed. Any public official or public employee who in the discharge of his official duties would be required to vote on a matter that would result in a conflict of interest shall abstain from voting and, prior to the vote being taken, publicly announce and disclose the nature of his interest, as a public record in a written memorandum filed Stewart, Arthur J., Esquire, 94 -632 December 2, 1994 Page 4 with the person responsible for recording the minutes of the meeting at which the vote is taken, provided that whenever a governing body would be unable to take any action on a matter before it because the number of members of the body required to abstain from voting under the provisions of this section makes the majority or other legally required vote of approval unattainable, then such members shall be permitted to vote if disclosures are made as otherwise provided herein. In the case of a three - member governing body of a political subdivision, where one member has abstained from voting as a result of a conflict of interest, and the remaining two members of the governing body have cast opposing votes, the member who has abstained shall be permitted to vote to break the tie vote if disclosure is made as otherwise provided herein. If a conflict exists, Section 3(j) requires the public official /employee to abstain and to publicly disclose the abstention and reasons for same, both orally and by filing a written memorandum to that effect with the person recording the minutes or supervisor. In the event that the required abstention results in the inability of the governmental body to take action because a majority is unattainable due to the abstention(s) from conflict under the Ethics Law, then in that event participation is permissible provided the disclosure requirements noted above are followed. See, Mlakar, Advice 91- 523 -S. In applying the above provisions of the Ethics Law to the circumstances which you have submitted, pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Ethics Law, a public official /public employee is prohibited from using the authority of public office /employment or confidential information received by holding such a public position for the private pecuniary benefit of the public official /public employee himself, any member of his immediate family, or a business with which he or a member of his immediate family is associated. The issue of whether a public official may use the authority of his public position to secure or accept legal representation at the expense of the governmental body is a very complex issue which Stewart, Arthur J., Esquire, 94 -632 December 2, 1994 Page 5 hinges upon the nature of his conduct which is in question. The dilemma is that until the facts are established in a case, it cannot be conclusively determined whether publicly paid legal representation is permissible. Meanwhile, if the public official secures — or even accepts — publicly paid legal representation to which he is not entitled, he risks being found in violation of Section 3(a) of the Ethics Law. There appears to be only one case addressing the issue of publicly provided legal representation for a public official's defense in a matter before the State Ethics Commission. A 1989 Westmoreland County Decision, In Re: Appeal from the 1987 Auditor's Report of North Huntington Township, No. 11 Civil 1988, Opinion and Order of June 1, 1989 (Westmoreland County), held that a Township Commissioner could not and should not have been represented before the State Ethics Commission at the Township's expense. The base allegations were that the Township Commissioner had received excess reimbursement from the Township for conferences /conventions, which the Court stated might constitute official misconduct and would certainly constitute conduct personal in nature. The Court stated that whether a public official is entitled to publicly funded representation does not hinge upon whether he has been successful on the merits in his defense. Rather, it hinges upon whether the charges concern performance of official duties or concern conduct personal in nature. Id. at 8 -9. The following appellate decisions are also pertinent to the issue which you have raised. In Roofner's Appeal, 81 Pa. Super 482 (1923), the Superior Court stated that a township supervisor is not entitled to township paid legal representation for his actions which are of a private rather than public nature. In that case, township supervisors had used township funds for legal representation when they were charged with unlawfully neglecting and refusing to keep a particular township road safe for travel. In Stork v. Sommers, 158 Pa. Commw. Ct. 65, 630 A.2d 984 (1993), the Commonwealth Court held that a city treasurer was entitled to a public defense when he acted in his official capacity 1 The few State Ethics Commission precedents on the issue of publicly paid legal representation for public officials determined that it is a violation of the Ethics Law for a township supervisor to use township paid legal representation to challenge the wages set for him as a township employee. See, Borland, Order No. 785; Sanders, Order No. 786; Hessinger, Order No. 931 (appeal pending before Commonwealth Court, No. 1732 C.D. 1994); Wasiela, Order No. 932 (appeal pending before Commonwealth Court, No. 1733 C.D. 1994) . Stewart, Arthur J., Esquire, 94 =632 December 2, 1994 Page 6 to refuse to sign certain checks related to a fund which the treasurer believed had been subject to fraudulent abuses by the city mayor. Silver v. Downs, 493 Pa. 50, 425 A.2d 359 (1981) involved the defense of two township supervisors in a recall action which involved official acts as to the handling of township accounts and spending and which did not involve accusations of personal wrongdoing. The Supreme Court noted that township supervisors are statutorily entitled to publicly provided legal counsel to defend their official actions under such circumstances. Id., 493 Pa. at , 425 A.2d at 363 (citing 53 P.S. § 65582). In In Re: Birmingham Township, Delaware County, 142 Pa. Commw. 317, 597 A.2d 253 (1991), the Commonwealth Court applied Silver v. Downs, supra, and held that a supervisor is entitled to a public defense in a recall action where there is no substantial supporting evidence for allegations of criminal conduct, but is not entitled to a public defense where it is determined that the official did commit criminal conduct which results in removal from office. The Commonwealth Court stated: The Supreme Court in Silver v. Downs established the rule that in a recall action, those officials facing a possible recall ordinarily have the right to a defense paid out of township funds. The Supreme Court implicitly stated however, that when the conduct alleged was of a criminal nature, the defense should not be available. The two main concerns addressed by the Supreme Court were that township officials should not be forced out of office in order to avoid the substantial legal costs of defending their official actions but also that the local government should not pay for the defense of an official who committed an act of criminal misconduct while in office. See Silver v. Downs, 493 Pa. at 55 -57, 425 A.2d at 362 -364. Addressing these concerns, we believe the Supreme Court in Silver v. Downs envisioned a procedure where if the local government votes to provide a defense in a recall action, that decision can be challenged by the electors at a hearing held to determine if substantial evidence exists that the official in question committed an act of criminal misconduct, fraud, embezzlement or other criminal conduct found in Silver v. Downs to be of the type which could not be taken in any official capacity. If substantial evidence is found to exist to support the allegation of criminal conduct, the public official should be denied a public defense. Stewart, Arthur J., Esquire, 94 -632 December 2, 1994 Page 7 In Re: Birmingham Township, supra, 142 Pa. Commw. at , 597 A.2d at 257 (Note omitted). The Court further noted: . . . to insure that a public official receives legal representation in defending his or her official actions, we believe that if the official is denied a public defense and it is later judicially determined that substantial evidence did not in fact exist to support the allegation, the official is entitled to reimbursement from the local government for attorney fees and costs expended in defending that allegation. Conversely, to foreclose the possibility that the local government would have to pay for the defense of a public official's criminal conduct, we believe that if the official is provided with a public defense and it is later judicially determined that the official did in fact commit the criminal conduct resulting in his or her removal from office, the local government is entitled to recover the attorney fees and costs of defending that particular allegation. Id., 142 Pa. Commw. at , 597 A.2d at 258 (Note omitted). Having set forth all of the above precedents, some conclusions can be reached. A public official who is found to have engaged in criminal conduct is not entitled to a public defense. Otherwise, a public official is entitled to publicly paid legal representation as to official conduct but not as to conduct which is personal in nature. As noted above, it would be difficult if not impossible to predict in advance whether a public official under investigation by the State Ethics Commission would ultimately be entitled to have his legal representation paid by his governmental body. Meanwhile, any use of office or the authority of office by the public official to secure or accept publicly paid legal representation to which he was not entitled would violate Section 3(a) of the Ethics Law. Under the circumstances, the better course of action for a Township Supervisor in such a position would be to refrain from securing for himself — or even accepting — township paid representation pending the final outcome of the case. If based upon the outcome of the case, the Supervisor would be entitled to a public defense, pursuant to the Commonwealth Court ruling in In Re: Birmingham Township, supra, the Supervisor could seek to recover the attorney fees and costs expended without risk of transgressing Section 3(a) of the Ethics Law. The propriety of the proposed conduct has only been addressed under the Ethics Law; the applicability of any other statute, code, ordinance, regulation or other code of conduct other than the Stewart, Arthur J., Esquire, 9 -632 December 2, 1994 Page 8 such. Ethics Law has not been considered in that they do not involve an interpretation of the Ethics Law. Specifically not addressed herein is the applicability of the Second Class Township Code. Conclusion: A township supervisor is a public official subject to the provisions of the Ethics Law. The question of whether a township supervisor is entitled to legal representation at township expense in defending himself before the. State Ethics Commission as to alleged violations of the Ethics Law hinges upon whether the conduct in question was official conduct or conduct of a personal nature, and whether the conduct was criminal. It is recommended that a township supervisor refrain from securing — or even accepting — township paid legal representation pending the final outcome of a matter before the State Ethics Commission, to enable a conclusive determination of the propriety or impropriety of such township paid legal representation in the particular case. Lastly, the propriety of the proposed conduct has only been addressed under the Ethics Law. Pursuant to Section 7(11), this Advice is a complete defense in any enforcement proceeding initiated by the Commission, and evidence of good faith conduct in any other civil or criminal proceeding, providing the requestor has disclosed truthfully all the material facts and committed the acts complained of in reliance on the Advice given. This letter is a public record and will be made available as Finally, if you disagree with this Advice or if you have any reason to challenge same, you may appeal the Advice to the full Commission. A personal appearance before the Commission will be scheduled and a formal Opinion will be issued by the Commission. Any such appeal must be in writing and must be actually received at the Commission within fifteen (15) days of the date of this Advice pursuant to 51 Pa. Code 513.2(h). The appeal may be received at the Commission by hand delivery, United States mail, delivery service, or by FAX transmission (717- 787 - 0806). Failure to file such an appeal at the Commission within fifteen (15) days may result in the dismissal of the appeal. i incerely, in cent . D•pko Chief Counsel