HomeMy WebLinkAbout86-632 DeetzRichard E. neetz, Esquire
1111 North Fifth Street
Stroudsburg, PA 18360
Mad,ng Address
State Ethics Commission
308 Finance Building
P. 0. Box 11470
Harrisburg, Pa. 17108 -1470
necemher 9, 19R6
AfVICF (1F COUNSEL
86 -632
Re: Conflict of Interest, Township Supervisors, Voting on Matter Relating to
Employer, Rule of Necessity
near Mr. neetz_:
This responds to your letter of November 14, 14R6, wherein you requested
the advice of the State Ethics Commission.
issue: whether any conflict of interest or prohibitions would arise under the
State Ethics Act if township supervisors were to participate in a township
decision regarding a developer which has employed two of the township
supervisors as suh- contractors on a construction project.
Facts: As the Solicitor to the Roard of Township Supervisors for Middle
Smithfield Township, Monroe County, Pennsylvania, you have requested the
advice of the State Ethics Commission in relation to the above issue. You
advise that two of the three elected township supervisors have, in the past,
heen employed as independent contractors hy a land owner in the township who
has official applications pending hefore the Roard of Supervisors. One
supervisor runs an excavating business and the other supervisor is a
self - employed electrician. The land owner, in question, is starting some
extensive developments in the township, and has hired two of the three
supervisors, one as an excavator and the other as an electrician for
particular jobs on an independent contractor hasis. You advise that both
supervisors have publicly disclosed that they have been hired hy the land
owner. You advise that the land owner has another application, which will
require review and approval hefore the township hoard of supervisors. You do
not indicate whether the application involved in that situation relates to the
development in which the supervisors are involved privately. we will assume,
for the purpose of this advice, therefore, that the application relates to
another project and that the supervisors are not being asked to consider a
matter in which they are specifically involved. You have requested the advice
State Ethics Commission • 308 Finance Building • Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
Richard E. Deetz, Esquire
December 9, 1986
Page 2
of the State Ethics Commission in light of the fact that the township is
governed by a three member board of supervisors and two of the board members
will be potentially disqualified from acting in this situation.
Discussion: Members of a township board of supervisors are clearly public
officials as that term is defined in the State Ethics Act. 65 P.S. §402. As
such, their conduct must conform to the requirements of the State Ethics Act.
Sowers, 80 -050; Welz, 86 -001.
Generally, the State Ethics Act provides as follows:
Section 3. Restricted activities.
(a) No public official or public employee shall use his
public office or any confidential information received
through his holding public office to obtain financial gain
other than compensation provided by law for himself, a
member of his immediate family, or a business with which
he is associated. 65 P.S. 403(a).
In addition to the above provision of law, the Ethics Act authorizes the
State Ethics Commission to address other areas of possible conflict. 65 P.S.
§403(d). Such a conflict of interest would exist in a situation where a
public official attempts to serve one or more interests that are adverse.
See, Alfano, 80 -007.
Generally, there is no doubt that public officials, including township
supervisors, are precluded from participating in any matter in which they have
a personnel pecuniary interest. See, Commonwealth v. Raudenbush, 249 Pa. 86,
99 A. 555, (1915); Eways v. Reading Parking Authority, 385 Pa. 592 124 A.2d
92, (1956); Reckner v. German Township, 341 Pa. 375, 19 A.2d 402, (1941).
This Commission has, within the purview of the State Ethics Act, similarly
determined that public officials may not act upon a matter in which they have
a personal financial interest. Sowers, 80 -050; King, 85 -025.
In the instant situation, we are confronted with the situation where a
majority of the members of the township board of supervisors have had business
dealings with the individual who now has presented an application to the
township supervisors for review, consideration and ultimate decision. In
similar situations, this Commission has, in the past, ruled that a township
supervisor would be prohibited from participating in any matter involving an
individual who has employed their services in a private capacity. See, Welz,
86 -001. The instant situation, however, is complicated by the fact that the
majority of the board of township supervisors have been so employed by this
individual and, as a result, the township board of supervisors would appear to
be, under the above requirements of the Ethics Act, confronted with the
situation where they would not be able to perform their duties as public
officials and which would result in the particular developer not having a
forum in which to present his proposal or application.
Richard E. Deetz, Esquire
fecemher 9, 1986
Page 3
Tn such a situation, this Commission has previously invoked the common
law of Rule of Necessity in order that the governmental unit may properly
perform its puhlic function. Ry invoking the Rule of Necessity, which is
discussed below, the memhers of the hoard of supervisors will he ahle to
follow certain precautions and guidelines in relation to township decisions
regarding their development. The Commission's use of this particular rule was
originally set forth in Hahalis, R3 -009.
Perhaps the most succinct statement of the Rule of Necessity is found in
Turner v. American Rar Association, 497 F. Supp. 451 (1975), where the Court
dismissed action brought against members of the federal judiciary and others
hy plaintiffs who claimed they had a constitutional right to have unlicensed
lay counsel assist them in court proceedings. In its discussion, the Court
noted, "there is a maxim of law to the effect that where all are disqualified,
none are disqualified." Id. at 483, citing Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245
(1920). The Court continued, stating "the theory supporting this maxim is
that if disqualification operates so as to bar justice to the parties and no
other trihunal is availahle, the disqualified judge or judges may, hy
necessity, proceed to judgment." Id. at 483.
From the very necessity of the case has grown the rule
that disqualification will not he permitted to destroy the
only trihunal with power in the premises. If the law
provides for a suhstitution of personnel on hoard or
court, or if another trihunal exists to which resort may
he had, a disqualified member may not act. Rut when no
such provision is made, the law cannot he nullified or the
doors to justice harred because of prejudice or
disqualification of a memher of a court a
administrative trihunal. Id. at 357.
in Kennett v. Levine, 59 Wash. 2d 212, 310 P.2d 244 (1957), the Court
held that the Rule of Necessity applied where a puhlic body is given exclusive
jurisdiction over a matter and no suhstitue trihunal is provided hy law. See
also Lnughram v. F.T.f,, 143 F.2d 431 (C.f.A. 8th 1944), where only one
trihunal is provided hy law, that trihunal must he permitted to act under the
Rule of Necessity.
It is important to note that the Rule of Necessity is entirely
inapplicahle when there exists, as stated above, a method of providing a
qualified trihunal, such as hy exclusion from the trihunal of disqualified
memhers. See, Pyatt v. Mayor and Council, 9 N.J. 54R, 89 A.2d 1 (1952);
appointing a different memhership, See, Smith v. Dept. of Registration, 412
I11. 332, 106 N.F.2d 722 (1952); counting only the votes of the qualified
memhers, See, Thompson v. City of Long Reach, 41 Cal. 2d 235, 259 P.2d 649
Richard E. Deetz, Esquire
December 9, 1986
Page 4
(1953); or resorting to another available tribunal, See, Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510 (1927). For the purposes of this Opinion, the Commission assumes
that none of the alternatives enumerated above exists by which the board may
form a quorum or obtain a majority vote and to take official action, and we
hold that the Rule of Necessity, under these appropriate circumstances, could
apply to allow participation /voting by an otherwise disqualified official.
In this light, we must discuss what constitutes a quorum, because for
purposes of invoking the Rule of Necessity, a sufficient number of supervisors
must be disqualified under the Ethics Act for the rule to apply. Unless
otherwise specified under Pennsylvania and common law, a quorum of the board
would be constituted by a majority if its members, that is at least four out
of seven members, and official action could be taken by a positive vote of the
majority of the quorum, for example, three out of four. See, DiGiacinto
v. City of Allentown, 486 Pa. 436, 406 A.2d 520, 522 (1979).
Unrestricted application of the Rule of Necessity, however, could result
in a situation where all of the three of four members who constitute a quorum
would normally be disaqualified while the members not normally disqualifed are
not present. While such a result might generally be permissible, the Ethics
Commission believes that in keeping with the letter and spirit of the Ethics
Act, the votes of the normally disqualified members must be tempered by the
vote or possible votes of members who have no conflict of interest and,
therefore, are not disqualified with respect to subject matter. In this
regard, the Commission believes that application of the Rule of Necessity must
be limited to situations where obtaining a quorum is possible only when
normally disqualified members are allowed to vote in addition to members not
disqualified and who do not have a conflict of interest in the matter at
hand.
To illustrate, in the present situation in the board, two members of the
board would constitute a quorum. Where two out of three members of the board
would normally be disqualified from participating, the member without a
conflict of interest must be part of those members constituting the voting
quorum. This Rule of Necessity, of course, would be inapplicable if the board
could obtain a votiny quorum of non - disqualified members.
Thus, where there are board members who do not have a conflict of
interest, those members must be included in a quorum of at least two out of
three members of the board, and the Rule of Necessity may be applied to allow
the other normally disqualified members to 'vote in addition to a normally
qualified member so that body may transact official business.
Richard E. Oeetz, Esquire
December 9, 19R6
Page 5
Additionally, it should he noted that the State Ethics Act provides as
fol lows:
Section 3. Restricted activities.
(b) No person shall offer or give to a puhlic official or
puhlic employee or candidate for puhlic office or a memher
of his immediate family or a husiness with which he is
associated, and no puhlic official or puhlic employee or
candidate for puhlic office shall solicit or accept,
anything of value, including a gift, loan, political
contrihution, reward, or promise of future employment
hased on any understanding that the vote, official action,
or judgment of the puhlic official or puhlic employee or
candidate for puhlic office would he influenced therehy.
65 P.S. 403(h).
We reference to this particular provision of law, not to imply that there
is or will he any violation of the State Fthics Act, in this respect, hut
merely to provide. a complete response to your question. Suhstantial
questions, under the ahove provision of law could develop if, for example, the
developer, in question, routinely hired puhlic officials to perform work for
him and subsequently approached the governmental holy on which those officials
served for particular action. Once again, we note that the ahove is not
intended to imply that there has or will he any violation of the State Fthics
Act hut merely to point nut the pertinent provisions of the law and the
potential questions that could arise thereunder.
Conclusion: Under the State Ethics Act, puhlic officials generally may not
participate in any matter wherein they have a pecuniary interest. Tt is
advised that the supervisors should proceed in the manner set forth in this
advice so as to avoid any potential conflict of interest. Because under the
current situation, the disqualification of two memhers of the hoard of
supervisors would result in the township's inability to take official action
in certain matters, it is advised that the township should apply a limited
application of the common law Rule of Necessity. Such application would allow
the normally disqualified memhers to participate in forming a quorum and
voting in addition to the normally qualified member. In this case where two
nut of the three supervisors are normally disqualified, a quorum may he formed
under this application of the Rule of Necessity and normally disqualifed
memhers may vote so long as the qualified member is present as part of the
quorum and vote. In such a sitution, the township shoud give advance notice
to the puhlic that the matters will he considered requiring the application of
the Rule of Necessity and the puhlic record should reflect the reasons for the
application of this rule. It is also suhmitted, that the extent and nature of
the husiness relationship hetween the supervisors and the developer he
disclosed.
Richard F. neetz, Esquire
necemher R, 1(1R6
Page f
Pursuant to Section 7(Q)(ii), this Advice is a complete defense in any
enforcement proceeding initiated by the Commission, and evidence of good faith
conduct in any other civil or criminal proceeding, providing the requestor has
disclosed truthfully all the material facts and committed the acts complained
of in reliance on the Advice given.
This letter is a puhlic record and will he made availahle as such.
Finally, if you disagree with this Advice or if you have any reason to
challenge same, you may request that the full Commission review this Advice. A
personal appearance before the Commission will he scheduled and a formal
Opinion from the Commission will he issued. Any such appeal must he made, in
writing, to the Commission within 15 days of service of this Advice pursuant
to 51 Pa. Code 2.12.
ohn J Contino
General Counsel